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eyewitness identifications in this case, but refused to allow him to offer his opinion
about whether the identifications were reliable?
"The trial court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of expert
testimony, and such decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
Under this standard, [the appellate court] will not reverse unless the decision
exceeds the limits of reasonability." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 136] (Utah
1993) (citations omitted).
2. Were the eyewitness identifications "constitutionally reliable" and their
admission consistent with the due process guarantees of the Utah Constitution?
"The constitutionality of an identification procedure is a mixed question of
law and fact." State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah App. 1995) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). "[Tjrial courts have a measure of discretion to
determine whether eyewitness identifications are reliable." Id. at 1236. Review is
"less than de novo" because "whether an eyewitness identification is reliable under
the totality of the circumstances is highly fact dependant, and the fact patterns are
quite variable." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "On the other
hand, a sufficiently careful review is necessary to assure that the purposes of the
[reliability of eyewitness identifications] are served." Id. (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
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disguised. Id. Defendant, the heavy set man, wore a hat, sunglasses, and a fake
moustache. Id. at 107-108. He pulled a gun and said, "Don't do anything stupid.
This is a robbery. Where do you guys h[o]ld the money?" Id. at 41-42.
Oscar had no idea where the money was kept, but proceeded with the men to
the building where employees reported for work. Id. at 41-43. As they approached
the building, they saw Lou Livolsi, the manager, and Channing Jones, the operations
manager. Id. at 43, 154.
Oscar told the men that Lou was the manager. Defendant showed Lou his
gun and again said, "[T]his is a robbery. We don't want you to do anything stupid."
Id. at 43-46, 108. He then asked Lou where the money was kept. Id. at 108. Lou
told him it was in the safe, but that he didn't have a key. Lou sent Dave Peterson,
another lifeguard, to get Jill Pittman Roberts, the cash control manager, who did
have a key. Id. at 109.
After Dave got Jill, the group continued to the building where the money was
kept. They knocked on the door, and Janea Seager Jones, an employee in cash
control, let them in. Id. at 84, 134. The cash control office was divided into two
rooms—an approximately three by nine foot entry room, where money was counted,
and a rear locked vault. Id. at 84-86, 134. Jill opened the vault, and Lou and Jill
helped defendant fill two gym bags with $25,000 to $28,000 in currency. Id. at
112-13, 137-138.
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Meanwhile, defendant's accomplice wire-tied (flex-cuffed) the other
employees' hands behind their backs and duct-taped their mouths. Id. at 113, 176.
When the bags were filled, defendant asked for Lou's car keys. Id. at 114. Because
Lou didn't have them, defendant asked for and received Oscar's car keys. Id. The
accomplice went out to get Oscar's car and drove it into the Raging Waters
compound close to the cash control door. Id. Defendant and his accomplice then
wire-tied and duct-taped Lou and Jill, told everyone to wait ten minutes before they
did anything, and went out the back door. Id. at 115, 138.
As soon as the door shut, two employees managed to dial 911 and the other
employees began helping one another remove their ties and duct tape. Id. at 94,
115. The police arrived within minutes. Id. at 94. While the on-site investigation
was still in progress, authorities located Oscar's car a few blocks away. Id. at 53.
Later that day Channing helped Detective Ray Dalling prepare computergenerated composites of the robbers. Id. at 173-174. Oscar, Lou, and Jill all saw
the composites. Id. at 57, 120-121, 142.1 Detective Dalling also prepared a photo
spread using six pictures from police files. Id. at 180.
About two months after the robbery, Channing saw defendant on television
and called Detective Dalling. Id. at 164-165. Detective Dalling then asked
Channing to come in to view the photo spread, and Channing identified defendant

1

Oscar apparently also helped prepare the composites. See R. 315:47.
5

Id. at 178-79. A few days later, Detective Dalling had Oscar come in, and Oscar
also identified defendant. Id. at 179-180. Prior to their identifications, Detective
Dalling told both Channing and Oscar that the person who robbed them might or
might not be pictured. Id. at 184.
Oscar, Jill, Lou, Janea, and David viewed an October 17, 1997 lineup at the
Salt Lake County Jail. State's Exhibit 27. Defendant was number six of six lineup
participants. Id. Oscar and Jill identified defendant as the individual involved in
the Raging Waters crime. Id. Lou wrote that he was "pretty sure, but not definite"
that number six was the robber. Id. Janea indicated that she was not sure, but
thought number three was the individual. David marked his form "3 or 6[,]
probably 3." Id. Oscar, Jill, Lou, and Janea testified about their lineup
identifications at trial. R. 116:62, 96, 119, 144-145. David was unavailable, and
the parties stipulated that the court reporter present at the lineup would testify to the
content of David's identification. R. 317:196.
Oscar, Lou, Jill, and Channing also identified defendant at trial. R. 316:64,
119, 145, 166. Oscar testified that he had viewed defendant at a very close distance
at several junctures during the crime. Id. at 41, 45-46, 66. Lou, Jill, and Channing
also testified to viewing defendant both at close range and in full sun. Id. at 113,
117, 122, 123, 129, 136, 156.

6

Defendant called David Dodd, Ph.D., a University of Utah psychologist, to
present expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification. Dr. Dodd
testified that it was more difficult to identify an individual after a single, short
viewing than after repeated exposures. R. 317:204. He also testified that disguises,
distraction (by a weapon), fear, and stress interfere with the accurate acquisition of
information. Id. at 204-208. He stated that the passage of time interferes with
retention of information. Id. at 209. He also said that suggestion may interfere with
retention—that viewing composites or photographs may affect memory. Id. at 209.
He further testified that suggestion may affect the retrieval of identification
information. Id. at 210. If, for instance, a witness believes that an individual will
be in a lineup, the witness will be more likely to pick one of the lineup participants
than he would be if he were uncertain that the individual would be in the lineup. Id.
Dr. Dodd also testified that he gave ten mock witnesses the physical
description of the perpetrator in this case and then showed them the photo spread.
Id. at 211-212. He stated that, based on this description, the mock witnesses chose
only three of the six photographs. Id. at 212. He therefore concluded that the
"functional equivalent of this [photo spread] was three," suggesting that the photo
spread contained only three meaningful choices, not six. Id. at 213. He testified
that a witness who took three minutes to make a selection from a photo array might
be less reliable than a witness who responded more quickly, but conceded on cross-
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examination that reliability depended on what the witness was thinking during that
period. Id. at 215, 224-225. He also stated that the correlation between accuracy
and confidence is minimal. Id. at 216.
Defense counsel then asked Dr. Dodd if he had "an opinion as to whether the
process of identification in this case raise[d] serious questions as to [its] reliability."
Id. at 216. The prosecutor objected, and the court sustained the objection, stating
that this was "within the province of the jury." Id. The court also denied defense
counsel's request to argue the objection outside the presence of the jury. Id. at 217.
The trial court gave the jury a lengthy cautionary instruction on eyewitness
identification based on State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 494 n.8 (Utah 1986). R. 249251.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly excluded the expert's opinion on the reliability of the
victims' eyewitness identification. While the admission of that testimony may have
been permissible under the evidence rules, it was not mandatory. The trial judge did
not abuse his discretion in excluding that information where it may not have assisted
the trier of fact and where it may have been more prejudicial than probative,
confusing or misleading to the jury, and needlessly cumulative.
The trial court also properly determined that the eyewitness testimony was
constitutionally reliable and therefore could be presented to the jury. Applying the

8

analysis set forth in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991), the court
considered the relevant factors to determine that "under the totality of the
circumstances," the identifications were reliable. Id.
ARGUMENT
Point I
The trial court properly excluded the expert's conclusory opinion
on the reliability of the eyewitness identification. The court applied
the appropriate legal factors. Any error was harmless.
Defendant argues that the trial judge abused his discretion when he refused to
allow the expert witness to testify about the reliability of the eyewitness
identifications in this case. Br. Aplt. at 24. Defendant argues that the judge abused
his discretion because (1) he misapplied the evidence rules that permit expert
testimony on this matter, and (2) he was hostile toward expert identification
evidence. Id. at 25-26, 31. Finally, defendant argues that the refusal to allow this
testimony was harmful. Id. at 34.
A.

The trial court properly exercised its discretion to exclude the expert's
conclusory opinion on the reliability of the eyewitness identification.
Defendant apparently argues that because rules 702 and 704 permit expert

testimony on an "ultimate issue," they therefore require its admission. See Br. Aplt.
at 27-28. That argument misstates the reach of the rules on expert testimony.
Further, the argument disregards the interplay between these rules and other rules
governing admissibility of evidence. A court's inquiry into the admissibility of
9

evidence under rules 702 and 704 is the beginning, not the end, of its inquiry into
whether the evidence should be admitted.
Trial courts have wide discretion to determine the admissibility of expert
testimony, and their decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v.
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). This Court "will not reverse unless the
decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." Id.
The relevant evidence rules in this case are rules 403, 702, and 704. Rule 702
states that an expert may testify if his testimony will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence. Rule 704 provides that testimony, otherwise admissible, is
not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact. These expert testimony rules must be read in conjunction with the general
relevancy requirements of rules 401-403, especially the provisions of rule 403 that
permit the exclusion of relevant evidence when "its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury" or when it is needlessly cumulative.
"[R]ule 704 does not make expert testimony admissible simply because it
expresses an opinion regarding an ultimate issue." Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1362
(emphasis in original). Rather, that testimony is admissible if the trial judge, in the
exercise of his discretion, determines that (1) the testimony will assist the trier of
fact "to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," (2) its probative
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value is greater than "the danger of unfair prejudice [and] confusion," and (3) it is
not needlessly cumulative. Utah R. Evid. 702, 403.
Defendant's cites Larsen to support his argument that the trial court erred
when it excluded the expert's conclusory opinion on the reliability of the victim's
eyewitness identifications. Larsen does not support defendant's argument.
In Larsen, unlike the instant case, the defendant challenged the admission, not
the exclusion, of expert testimony. Larsen argued that expert testimony was not
"helpful" under rule 702 because "it transgressed into the area reserved for the
jury." 865P.2dat 1361.
Before addressing the rule 702 "helpfulness" issue, the Larsen court observed
that "rule 704 does not make expert testimony inadmissible simply because it
expresses an opinion on the ultimate issue." Id. at 1362 (emphasis in original). The
court also observed, however, that "[R]ule 704 does not make expert testimony
admissible simply because it expresses an opinion regarding an ultimate issue." Id.
(emphasis in original). The Court held that rule 704 "permits" an expert "to express
an opinion regarding the ultimate resolution of [a] disputed issue as long as that
testimony is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence" Id. (emphasis
added).
Under the circumstances in Larsen, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in permitting the expert's testimony. The reviewing court observed, however, "We
do not suggest that the trial court must allow expert testimony [on an ultimate
11

issue]. We simply hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
the limited testimony in this case." Id. at 1363 n.12.
As Larsen makes clear, a trial court may properly exercise its discretion to
exclude expert testimony, including testimony on an ultimate issue. It may find that
expert eyewitness testimony is not helpful and is, in fact, prejudicial because the
aura of reliability and trustworthiness surrounding the expert's testimony poses a
substantial risk of interfering with the jury's role as fact-finder. See United States v.
Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381,
383 (1 st Cir. 1979); United States v. Collins, 395 F. Supp. 629, 636-637 (M.D. Pa.
1975), aff'd mem., 523 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1975); see also United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1226 (3d Cir. 1985) (observing that trial court should
exercise its discretion to balance the reliability of expert eyewitness testimony
against the likelihood that the testimony would overwhelm and mislead the jury).
Exclusion is particularly appropriate where the expert has had no contact with
the witnesses or with the defendant, and his only knowledge of the case comes from
his reading of police reports and his discussions with defense counsel. The trial
court may therefore conclude that the minimal probative value of the expert's
testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger that the jury may attach too
much weight to the expert's aura of reliability. See United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d
461, 465 (8th Cir. 1987).
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The court may also determine, in the exercise of its discretion, that an
eyewitness expert's proffered evidence is confusing or needlessly cumulative. See
United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rincon, 28
F.3d 921, 923-926 (9th Cir. 1994).
Except in rare instances, appellate courts do not disturb trial court rulings
either admitting or excluding evidence. "[I]n reviewing a trial court's decision to
admit or exclude evidence, we allow for broad discretion." State v. Eberwein, 2001
UT App 71,111, 21 P.3d 1139 (admitting evidence); see also State v. Payne, 964
P.2d 327, 332 (Utah App. 1998) (excluding evidence). This deference reflects the
superior opportunity of the trial judge to gauge the extent to which the expert's
testimony would be helpful to the jury.
In this case, the trial court's exclusion was very carefully limited. The court
permitted the expert to testify to a wide range of factors affecting the reliability of
eyewitnesses. R. 317:204-210. The court also allowed him to testify about how
evidence specific to this case—defendant's disguise, one of the witness's having
been "scared to death," the composition of the photo spread, and the time spent by
one witness to pick a photo from the photo spread—may have affected the
reliability of eye witness identifications. Id. at 205, 208, 211-213.2 The court

2

In addition to the admitted expert testimony, defendant's cross-examination of
State witnesses and closing arguments addressed the reliability of eyewitness
identifications. See State v. Payne, 964 P.2d at 332 (upholding exclusion of expert
(continued...)
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excluded only the expert's testimony on the conclusory question, "[D]o you have an
opinion as to whether the process of identification in this case raises serious
questions as to [its] reliability?" The court ruled that this matter was "within the
province of the jury." Id. at 317:216.
Defendant asserts alternatively that the trial court misapplied the law because
it stated that the expert's testimony on this matter was "within the province of the
jury." Br. Aplt. at 26; R. 317:216. Defendant apparently argues that the trial court
did not exercise its discretion, but rather misapprehended the evidentiary rules or
other law to prohibit any testimony on ultimate issues.
Defendant construes this cursory phrase to make his argument. Nothing
suggests that the trial court felt itself bound to preclude the expert's testimony;
rather, when the prosecution objected, the court agreed that the testimony could and
should be excluded. The trial court most likely intended the phrase to convey its
determination that the expert's response to defense counsel's summary question in
this case posed a substantial risk of interfering with the jury's role as fact finder.
Balancing the probative value of expert eyewitness testimony against the
likelihood that the testimony would overwhelm and mislead the jury, the trial court
determined that the expert's conclusory opinion should be excluded. The decision

2

(... continued)
testimony and noting that "jury could reasonably [have been] expected to appreciate
[certain] concerns, which were called to its attention through cross-examination and
closing argument, without the assistance of expert testimony."
14

to exclude was a reasonable decision within the wide discretion trial courts have to
determine the admissibility of expert testimony.
B.

Defendant has not demonstrated that the trial judge failed to consider
pertinent facts or misapprehended the law when he sustained the
prosecutor's objection to defense counsel's conclusory question.
Defendant argues that the trial judge's personal reservations about the value of

eyewitness identification testimony caused him to exclude the expert's testimony.
He asserts that the trial court "repudiated]" the law and disregarded the jury's need
for assistance. See Aplt. Br. at 31-32. Defendant argues that the trial judge thus
failed to exercise a fully informed discretion. Id. at 32.
Defendant has pointed to no cases suggesting that the trial court must
articulate every basis upon which it exercises its discretion and that, failing to do so,
an appellate court may presume the failure to make "a fully informed decision." Id.
The authority defendant cites is, in fact, so tangentially relevant to the facts of this
case as to be more confusing than helpful. See Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 646
(Utah 1980) (holding that a parent's manifestation of her sexuality and resulting
behavior patterns are relevant to a determination of visitation rights and that trial
court's failure to consider them made impossible a fully informed exercise of
discretion); West Valley City v. Patten, 1999 UT App 149,fflf12, 14, 981 P.2d 420
(holding that trial judge's precipitous declaration of a mistrial without considering
less drastic alternatives constituted an abuse of discretion and that retrial violated ex
post facto protections) (both cases cited in Br. Aplt. at 31).
15

Further, nothing suggests that the trial judge "repudiated the well-established
law" on eyewitness identification. Br. Aplt. at 32. The trial judge both permitted
the eyewitness expert to testify and gave a jury instruction following the pattern set
forth in Long, 721 P.2d at 483. R. 249-251, 316:9.
Defendant argues that the trial judge "repudiated the well-established law"
when, at the evidentiary hearing, he stated that (1) from an "untrained eye
perspective" the photo spread was "a pretty good conglomeration of individuals
[with] similar characteristics" and (2) "[t]he testimony of Dr. Dodd was of little or
no circumstance to me." Br. Aplt. at 32; R. 315:106.
The trial judge did not repudiate well-established law; rather, he acted in
accordance with law to fulfill his "gatekeeping" responsibilities. When a defendant
challenges the constitutional admissibility of evidence, the defendant is entitled to a
determination by the court of the evidence's constitutional admissibility. See
Ramirez at 778 (holding that trial court has "charge as gatekeeper to carefully
scrutinize proffered evidence for constitutional defects"); State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d
940, 944 (Utah App. 1997) (stating that trial court cannot sidestep "its gatekeeping
responsibility by failing to determine the constitutional admissibility of the
eyewitness identification testimony").
Here, after defendant moved to suppress the eyewitness identification
testimony, the trial judge held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
evidence was constitutionally unreliable. R. 190-191, 315. He received from the
16

eyewitnesses the testimony they would offer at trial. R. 315:24-87. He also heard
the testimony of defendant's expert about factors that undermine the reliability of
eyewitness testimony. Id. at 87-102. He then determined that the proffered
eyewitness testimony was sufficiently reliable to present to the jury. Id. at 106.
In reaching this conclusion, the trial judge had to determine whether the photo
spread identification had been suggestive and whether the eyewitness identifications
were a product of suggestion. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783-784. He determined
from "an untrained eye perspective," in other words, from his perspective as a
judge, that it was not. He was not required to adopt the position of the expert, but
to hear all the evidence and then make a judicial determination. His statement that
the expert's testimony was "of little or no circumstance to me" was merely his
expression that the expert testimony had not convinced him that the eyewitness
testimony proffered was constitutionally unreliable.
Defendant also bristles at the trial judge's statement that the expert's
testimony would not be "revolutionary" and would "shed light on issues that I
assumed before the Long case were common knowledge." Br. Aplt. at 32;
R. 316:8-9. The trial judge made these statements in the context of his ruling, over
the prosecution's objection, that the expert could testify. The statements helped
explain why the prosecution would not be unfairly surprised by the expert's
testimony even though the prosecution had not received the expert's name as a
proposed witness at trial. R. 316:7-9. Defendant's argument that these statements
17

constituted a "repudiation of] the well established law and research on eyewitness
identification" is meritless. Br. Aplt. at 32.
C

Refusal to permit a response to the defendant's conclusory question on
the reliability of eyewitness testimony in this case was harmless.
Defendant argues that he was "severely harmed" by the trial court's refusal to

permit the expert to offer an opinion "as to whether the process of identification in
this case raise[d] serious questions as to [its] reliability." Br. Aplt. at 34;
R. 317:216.
Defendant was not harmed. Error in excluding evidence is not harmful unless
"absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to
the defendant." State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 697 (Utah App. 1995).
No reasonable likelihood exists that the jury would have returned a different
verdict, had Dr. Dodd been allowed to respond to defendant's conclusory question.
Dr. Dodd was permitted to testify to factors that can make eyewitness testimony
unreliable and to testify to those factors in the context of the evidence specific to
this case, i.e., defendant's disguise, one witness's fear, the composition of the photo
spread, and a witness's three or four minute study before picking a photo from the
photo spread. R. 317:205, 208, 211-213. The jurors had before them the expert's
testimony that eyewitness identifications can be unreliable and that the factors
undermining reliability were present in this case. Further, the court had given the
jurors a Long cautionary instruction on eyewitness identifications. R. 249-251; see
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721 P.2d at 494 n.8. The expert's conclusory opinion that the process of eyewitness
identification in this case raised serious reliability questions would have added
nothing more. Knowing that eyewitness identifications can be unreliable and
knowing that some of the factors undermining reliability may have been present
here, the jury nevertheless concluded that the eyewitness identifications in this case
established "beyond a reasonable doubt" that defendant was the perpetrator of this
crime. The expert's conclusory opinion would have made no difference.
Point II
After scrutinizing the proffered eyewitness testimony for constitutional defects,
the trial court made a proper preliminary determination that the eyewitness
identifications were sufficiently reliable for presentation to the jury.
Defendant argues that the eyewitness identifications by Oscar Contreras,
Channing Jones, Lou Livolsi, and Jill Pittman Roberts were constitutionally
unreliable and that the trial judge erred when he denied defendant's motion to
suppress. Br. Aplt. at 36, 38-46.
The trial judge did not err. Rather, he held an evidentiary hearing and
carefully scrutinized the proffered eyewitness testimony for constitutional defects.
R. 315:1, 103-106. After considering the legally relevant factors, he applied the
appropriate legal standard to determine that the identifications were constitutionally
reliable. Id. at 103-106.
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The appropriate legal standard is "whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, [an] identification was reliable." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. The
pertinent factors to be considered are these:
(1) "[t]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event;
(2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event;
(3) the witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her
mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed
and the likelihood that the witness could perceive, remember and relate
it correctly.
Id. No one factor is, by itself, determinative. For instance, even though a pretrial
identification procedure may be impermissibly suggestive, that factor alone is not
dispositive. The question remains "whether under the totality of the circumstances
the identification was reliable." Perry, 899 P.2d at 1238 (affirming conviction
despite "unduly suggestive" showup); see also Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784 (holding
that testimony warranted a preliminary determination of reliability despite?
"blatant[ly] suggestive[]" showup).
On review, this Court affords the trial court "a measure of discretion to
determine whether eyewitness identifications are reliable." Perry, 899 P.2d at 1236.
While the constitutionality of an identification procedure is a mixed question of law
and fact, review is "less than de novo" because the identifications involve varied
fact patterns and "reliability] under the totality of the circumstances is highly fact
dependant." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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A.

Applying the Ramirez standard, the trial judge properly determined that
the eyewitness testimony was sufficiently reliable for presentation to the
jury.
The trial court judge, looking at the "totality of the circumstances,"

determined that the eyewitness identifications were constitutionally reliable and
should be presented to the jury. See R. 315:107. He based this conclusion on the
factors outlined in Ramirez. Id. at 103-106.
1. Opportunity to view
The trial court observed that all the witnesses had an opportunity to view the
actor in sunlight or in a well-lit office. Id. at 103. Their distances from the actor
varied, both over the course of an individual eyewitness's interaction with the actor
and among the four eyewitnesses, from thirty yards down to one or two feet. Id.
Each witness, however, had an opportunity for face-to-face or close contact
observation for a period ranging from three or four minutes to a period of ten
minutes or more. Id. at 104.
The opportunity to view compares favorably to that in Ramirez, where the
court concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting an eyewitness
i

identification. See 817 P.2d at 784. The Ramirez eyewitness viewed a crouching
gunman, wearing "a white scarf covering most of his face," at a distance of about
ten to thirty feet for a very short period—variously stated by the witness to be "a
second," a "few seconds," and "a minute" or longer. Id. at 776, 782. The witness
was unable to see the masked lower portion of gunman's face. Id. at 782. He could
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not see the gunman's eyes clearly, although he could see that the gunman had small
eyes. Id. The Ramirez witnesses described the lighting at the crime scene as good,
but they also described it as poor and stated that the gunman was in a shadowy area.
Id. at 783.
2. Degree of attention.
The trial judge also determined that the witnesses' attention was focused once
the gun was shown and they became aware of the actor's intent to commit a
robbery. R. 315:105. Moreover, once the gun had been shown, little or no further
distraction occurred, and the eyewitnesses' attention was "riveted on the
identification of [the robbers]." Id. at 103.
The degree of attention is similar to that in Ramirez where the eyewitness was
also "fully aware that a robbery was taking place." 817 P.2d at 783.
3. Capacity to observe
The judge found that none of the witnesses' capacity to observe was impaired.
While they were frightened to a greater or lesser degree, their fright "did not
interfere with their ability and their capacity to observe and identify." R. 315:104.
Further, nothing suggested that they were biased or prejudiced, fatigued, or under
the influence or drugs or alcohol. Id. They "obviously ha[d] the mental acuity to
understand what was going on." Id. at 105.
Again, the comparison with Ramirez is favorable. The eyewitnesses here had
a greater capacity to observe than the Ramirez eyewitness. Like the Ramirez
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eyewitness, these eyewitnesses were subject to a heightened degree of stress and
fear because of a gun. Unlike the Ramirez witness, however, none of these
witnesses had been hurt, participated in a struggle, or heard one robber tell another
to kill them if they moved again. 817 P.2d at 776, 783.
4. Spontaneity, consistency, and lack of suggestion
The judge found the identifications remarkably consistent over time.
R. 315:105. He found that the eyewitnesses had no meaningful exposure to other
opinions "at least until after the lineup." Id. He found that the photo array was
"not so impermissible and suggestive that it would give rise to a substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Id. at 106.
When evaluating a pretrial photo identification procedure for suggestiveness,
"the main question is whether the photo array emphasized the defendant's photo
over others." State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1111 (Utah 1994). Some factors to be
considered include whether the police officers "manipulated the photos to indicate
that one of the photos portrayed the perpetrator" and "whether the photos
themselves were selected so that the defendant's photo stood out from the rest." Id.
Officer Dalling, who prepared the photo spread from pictures in the police
file, testified that he selected the photos "because of the age range, the shape of the
chin, the shape of the head, the basic features of each one were similar." R. 315:10.
His goal was to give a "fair representation" so that defendant did not "stand out
from anyone else." Id. He explained to both Channing and Oscar that the
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perpetrator might not be included in the photo spread, then "handed" them the
photos for their examination. Id. at 11, 13. Nothing suggests, nor does defendant
claim, that Detective Dalling either selected or manipulated the photos to emphasize
defendant.
Here, unlike Ramirez, the eyewitness identification occurred months after the
crime. However, the intervening photo spread was minimally suggestive, if
suggestive at all. In Ramirez, by contrast, the eyewitness identification followed a
"blatant[ly] suggestive[]" showup, where the defendant, the only person presented to
the eyewitness, was shown handcuffed to a chain link fence illuminated in the night
by police headlights. 817 P.2d at 784.
5. Nature of the event
The trial judge observed that the nature of the event, i.e., a robbery, served to
focus the attention of the victims on the activities around them. R. 315:105. Again,
this event was, like the Ramirez event, a robbery.
B.

The testimony of the individual witnesses supports the trial court's
findings and its legal determination.
Testimony offered by each eyewitness supports the trial court's determination

that the eyewitness testimony was reliable under Ramirez.
1. Oscar Contreras
Oscar had an adequate opportunity to view defendant. He was with defendant
for an extended period from the time when defendant approached him as he parked
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his car until defendant left the premises with the money. He spent about ten
minutes with him before he had to face the wall. R. 315: 57.
At the evidentiary hearing, Oscar described defendant's physical build, his
hair color and texture, and dress. Id. at 42-43, 53. He knew, from their first
exchange, that a robbery was in progress. Id. at 43. He saw defendant in full sun at
close range, from a distance of about two feet during the initial conversation. Id. at
45. While defendant spoke with Lou, Oscar again had "plenty of opportunity" to
observe him, "pretty much [from] the side." Id. at 46.
Oscar helped prepare a composite drawing of defendant, participated in the
photo array,3 and identified defendant at the lineup and at the preliminary hearing.
Id. at 47-49.
2. Channing Jones
Channing Jones was with defendant from the time he entered the water park
until he left with the money. He first saw him approaching from a distance of thirty
yards, but later observed him from close range—at about five feet for at least a

3

The record reflects some minor inconsistencies regarding Oscar's photo spread
identification. Oscar stated at the evidentiary hearing that he picked a photo from the
photo spread. R. 315:48. He testified at trial that he believed that he picked someone
from the photographs. R. 316:58. Detective Dalling testified at the evidentiary hearing
that Oscar selected two photos—defendant's and a filler. R. 315:14. He testified at trial
that Oscar made an identification and endorsed the back. R. 316:180. Detective
Dalling's apparent inconsistencies may have been the result of Oscar's inability to
identify defendant's co-perpetrator, a fact elicited on cross-examination at both
proceedings. R. 315:55, 316:85.
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couple of minutes. Id. at 25, 27-28. He observed defendant's build, his dress, his
fake moustache, his sunglasses, and his face in full light. Id. He observed
defendant both before and after he understood defendant's intent to rob. He also
observed defendant, albeit from the corner of his eye, while he was facing the wall
in the vault room.
Channing helped prepare the composite sketch. Id. at 30. Charming also saw
defendant later that year on television after he was arrested for another robbery. Id.
at 31. He called Detective Dalling the following day. Id. at 31-32. He later viewed
the photo spread and identified defendant as the perpetrator. Id. at 12, 32-33.
3. Lou Livolsi
Lou first observed defendant approaching him from a distance of twenty or
thirty feet. R. 315:73. He observed defendant's attire, general build, and fake
moustache. Lou was within five or ten feet when defendant asked where the money
was and showed his gun. Id. at 75. Lou looked at defendant while Dave Peterson
went to get Jill. After the group entered the cash control room, Lou helped
defendant load the money into the gym bags, looking directly at him for about five
minutes. Id. at 77-78.
Lou did not assist in preparing the composite, but viewed it later. Id. at 79.
He did not participate in the photo spread identification, but identified defendant at
a lineup, indicating that he was "pretty sure, but not definite" that defendant was the
perpetrator. Id. at 79-81; State's Exhibit 27. Although "shocked" that the robbery
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was occurring and somewhat nervous, Lou stated that he had been "in the water
park industry for a long time and dealt with catastrophic type things" and therefore
wasn't so nervous that he could not "remember who was there or what happened."
R. 315:85.
4. Jill Pittman Roberts
Jill, the cash control manager, first saw defendant when she went to get Lou
the keys to the cash room. Observing him about ten feet from her, she noted his
lifeguard type clothing, his stocky build, his dark hair shoved up under his hat, and
his fake moustache. Id, at 59. She thought his dress was "kind of hilarious." Id, at
60. She walked right next to him as they approached the cash room and looked
directly at him for a few seconds. Id. She assumed he had come to work on the
sprinklers. Id. at 61. She had no indication that anything was wrong until Lou
asked her to open the vault. Id.
After realizing that a robbery was in progress, Jill helped Lou fill the first
gym bag with cash and handed it to defendant. Id. at 63. She again looked at him
from a distance of eight feet or less. Id. She looked at him a final time before he
left. Id. at 64.
Jill saw the composite, but did not view the photo spread. Id. at 64-65. She
identified defendant at the lineup. Id. at 66; State's Exhibit 27.
The testimony adduced at the evidentiary hearing supported the trial judge's
determination that, under the totality of the circumstances, the identifications were
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sufficiently reliable to present to the jury. The evidence of reliability is, moreover,
more favorable than that found sufficient in Ramirez. Defendant has not
demonstrated that the trial court denied him due process when it refused to suppress
the identifications.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
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Addendum A

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of comnuttxng
robbe

7a)heuses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601*
(b) causes serious bodily ixyury upon another; or
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.

gule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
mne, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as
i basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The
engage in language is not one of substance,
go* 'surprise" would be within the concept of
*UI1fair prejudice" as contained in Rule 403. See
also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule
403 indicating that a continuance in most injfcoces would be a more appropriate method of

dealing with "surprise." See also Smith v
Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1977)
(surprise use of psychiatric testimony in capital
case ruled prejudicial and violation of due process). See the following Utah cases to the same
effect. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605
P2d 314 (Utah 1979); State v Johns, 615 P2d
1260 (Utah 1980); Reiser v Lohner, 641P 2d 93
(Utah 1982).
Croea References). — Admissibility of evidence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a).

Rule 702. Testimony by experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
feet to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim. Rule 56(2), Utah
Roles of Evidence (1971), was substantially the
as*.
Crost-Referencee. — Blood tests to detersane parentage, expert testimony, §§ 78-45a-7,

Discovery of expert's opinion, Rule 26(bX4),
U.R.C.P.
Drug paraphernalia, expert opinion in determining nature of object as, § 58-37a-4.
Pretrial conference, consideration of limiting
n u m ber of expert witneaaes, Rule 16, U R.C P

Rule 704* Opinion on ultimate i*fue.
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the form of an
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condit on
f
0 a defendant in a cnminal case may state an opinion or inference as to
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone,
/^nended effective October 1, 1992.)
advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
.ue federal rule, verbatim, and com porta with
Rule 56(4), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). See
gdwardi v. Didencksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah
1979).

This rule is identical to Rule 704 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence as amended in 1984

